U.S. Army War College

The papers included here, except for the editor's introduction, all come from the Strategic Studies Institute's annual conference on Russia in May 2012. In one way or another, they all point to the internal pathologies that render Russian security a precarious affair, at the best of times. As the editor suggests, the very fact of this precariousness makes Russia an inherently unpredictable and even potentially dangerous actor, not necessarily because it will actively attack its neighbors, though we certainly cannot exclude that possibility, but rather because it may come apart trying to play the role of a great power in Eurasia or elsewhere. As we all know, that outcome happened in 1917 and in 1989-91, with profound implications for international security and U.S. interests.

In recent years, attention by the U.S. national security establishment to challenges in the Western Hemisphere has concentrated on issues of transnational organized crime, socialist populism, potential terrorist threats, and similar challenges arising from poverty, inequality, and weak governance in parts of the region. As Latin America and the Caribbean nations have expanded their economic and other forms of engagement with countries beyond the region, the majority of attention has gone to activities in the region by the People's Republic of China, and to a lesser extent, by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The equally important re-engagement with the region by the Russian Federation during this period has received less attention, particularly among scholarly articles. Russia's re-engagement with the region, which began in earnest in 2008, coincided with an escalation in tension with the United States over the role of Russia in the civil war in Georgia and the related succession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Army has an opioid drug problem that is not going away under current personnel policies and medical practices. The survey results recorded here indicate that senior officers attending the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) recognize that the opioid problem is distinct in nature and origin from those of recreational drug abuse. Yet, these officers are saddled with a legacy drug enforcement structure and outdated procedures that do not track opioid usage across the force and do not address the root cause of the issue. They are commanding units under a regulatory structure that belatedly responds to opioid-related misuse with the same misconduct-focused disciplinary policies as those for recreational drug use, rather than with a proactive medical and personnel approach crafted for this unique problem set that emphasizes prevention and rehabilitation. The USAWC officer survey responses reflect the fact that the majority of these future Army leaders see misuse originating out of prescribing practices...

Because of the seamlessly international nature of the Internet, effective cyber security demands close cooperation with allies and friends overseas. Yet, because of the relatively young status of the discipline, national approaches to organizing and providing for cyber defense vary widely even among those countries whose interests are most closely aligned with those of the United States. The result is that the bodies and structures responsible for cyber defense, and their affiliations and mandates, can be difficult to understand. In this Letort Paper, British cyber policy researcher Keir Giles and German computer security specialist Kim Hartmann provide an overview of four different national approaches to cyber defense: those of Norway, Estonia, Germany, and Sweden. While providing a useful guide for engagement with the relevant governmental and other organizations in each of these countries, the Paper also compares and contrasts the advantages and drawbacks of each national approach.

The focus on Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014-15 has obscured other areas of contention which previously were prominent and problematic in relations between the United States and Russia. One such area is the strenuous Russian objection to U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense, most recently in the form of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). At some point in the near future, the issue of missile defense will once more be on the table with Russia; whether as a result of a relaxation of tensions allowing renewed bilateral discussion of security issues, or indeed because of an immediate threat of Russian escalatory action in response to the United States rolling out missile defense capabilities. In either case, U.S. policymakers and negotiators need to be prepared and fully acquainted with the wide range of issues at stake. In this respect, both the current monograph and its predecessor, European Missile Defense and Russia, provide an essential grounding...

Military personnel who have experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam, as well as senior leaders and military historians alike, will find this book by Dr. Chris Mason thought-provoking and useful. Dr. Mason examines indigenous personnel issues at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and uses empirical data and exhaustive research to argue that all three wars were lost before the first shots were fired-not on the battlefield, but at the strategic level of war. The United States interpreted all three conflicts as insurgencies, Mason writes, when in fact all three were civil wars in which the United States took a side. Success was never possible from the outset, his provocative thesis argues, because none of the three countries were nations for which the majority of their citizens were willing to fight and die. Nation-building is a slow, evolutionary, internal process through which the political identity of the peoples within a country's borders matures over centuries...

In a time of rapid change for the U.S. Army, it is essential to retain awareness of how potential adversaries are also developing their concepts of Landpower. This Letort Paper, written by an influential Russian general, lays out an authoritative view on the importance of substantial conventional land forces, as seen from Moscow. The year 2014 was an eventful one for the Russian military, opening with the seizure of Crimea, continuing through ongoing operations in and near Ukraine, and culminating with the issue of a new Military Doctrine reflecting what Russia describes as new security realities in Europe. All of these circumstances have drawn attention back to the challenge to U.S. interests posed by the Russian military. The issue of this Paper is therefore especially timely. The author, Major General Aleksandr Rogovoy, is a professor at the Russian General Staff Academy with a substantial record of academic and operational experience, and a direct contributor to the drafting of Russia's 2014 Military...

In November 2014, tense negotiations over the status of Iran's nuclear program resulted in a 7-month extension of a compliance deadline. In June 2015, negotiators will once again be grappling with the same intractable issues, where neither Iran nor the United States and its allies appear able to make the substantive concessions that would be necessary for a permanent agreement. This monograph, completed ahead of the November 2014 deadline, examines some of the underlying factors which will be constant in dealing with Iran under President Hassan Rouhani, and which will help determine the success or failure of talks in 2015. It surveys Rouhani's eventful first year in office in order to provide pointers to what may be possible-and to some key limiting factors-for Iran under his leadership. During that time, Rouhani was forced to balance his own progressive instincts with the instinctual caution of more conservative elements of the Iranian ruling elite.

The recent history of the conversation with Russia over plans for European missile defense has been one of repeated and unsuccessful attempts to allay strongly worded Russian concerns. None of these attempts has mitigated Russia's trenchant opposition to U.S. plans. At times, this opposition can appear based on grounds which are spurious or incomprehensible. In this monograph, Mr. Keir Giles, a British academic and long-term scholar of Russia, examines the history of missile defense, and the current dialogue, from a Russian perspective in order to explain the root causes of Russian alarm. He presents specific recommendations for managing the Russia relationship in the context of missile defense. Important conclusions are also drawn for the purpose of managing the dialogue over missile defense plans not only with Russia as an opponent, but also with European North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies as partners and hosts.

The Spratly Islands warrant better understanding by U.S. policymakers in order to discuss nuanced responses to the region's challenges. To attain that needed understanding, legal aspects of customary and modern laws are explored to analyze the differences between competing maritime and territorial claims, and why and how the parties involved stake rival claims or maritime legal rights. Throughout the policies of the United States are examined through its conflicted interests in the region. Recommendations for how the United States should engage these issues, a more appropriate task than trying to solve the disputes outright, are then offered.

In one way or another, these papers from the Strategic Studies Institute's annual conference on Russia in May 2012 included in this book all point to the internal pathologies that render Russian security a precarious affair at the best of times. As the editor suggests, the very fact of this precariousness makes Russia an in--herently unpredictable and even potentially danger--ous actor, not necessarily because it will actively at--tack its neighbors, though we certainly cannot exclude that possibility, but rather because it may come apart trying to play the role of a great power in Eurasia or elsewhere. As we all know, that outcome happened in 1917 and in 1989-91, with profound implications for international security and U.S. interests.

An apparent lack of interest by Russia in Sub-Saharan Africa over recent years masks persistent key strategic drivers for Moscow to re-establish lost influence in the region. A preoccupation with more immediate foreign policy concerns has temporarily interrupted a process of Russia reclaiming relationships that were well-developed in the Soviet period in order to secure access to mineral and energy resources which are crucial to Russia's economic and industrial interests, as well as both existing and new markets for military arms contracts. Russian policy priorities in Africa provide both challenges and opportunities for the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation, as well as energy security for the United States and its European allies. Russian development of key resources in southern Africa should be observed closely. Russian trade with the region is significantly underdeveloped, with the exception of the arms trade, which Russia can be expected to defend vigorously if its markets are challenged, including...

Understanding the political economy of Nigeria is needed to reveal the root causes of its many ethnic, religious, economic, and political problems and address them for the long term. The pressures now weighing on Nigeria could literally fracture the state along deep fault lines if rampant corruption and partisanship continues. As mutually important partners for both of our interests in Africa, the United States should assist in specific but indirect ways to help Nigerians overcome their political economic problems. Within such assistance, the role of the U.S. military is particularly delicate but needed through focused aid to specific programs and sharing of expertise, all best managed through employing units that are regionally aligned to Nigeria or West Africa.

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), newest of the six U.S. Department of Defense geographical combatant commands (CCMDs), was created in 2007 amid great controversy in both Africa and the United States over its location and mission. Over the last 5 years, AFRICOM has matured greatly, overcoming much of the initial resistance from African stakeholders through careful public messaging, and addressing most U.S. interagency concerns about the Command's size and proper role within the U.S. national security/foreign policy community. This Letort Paper describes the geostrategic, operational, and intellectual changes that explain why AFRICOM was created, and debunks three myths about AFRICOM: that it was created to "exploit" Africa's oil and gas riches, "blocks" China's rise in Africa, and that France "opposes" AFRICOM. The author concludes by raising five issues important to AFRICOM's future: 1) allocated forces to carry out short-term training engagements in Africa;...