Usmc Command and Staff College

The 2006 U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation which provides for the consolidation of Ill MEF on Okinawa and the subsequent relocation of approximately 8,000 Marines and Sailors from Okinawa to Guam has created a difficult political situation, a challenging operational scenario, and extreme logistical challenge that ill-postures the United States. Currently, internal politics within Japan has caused infighting that could threaten the entire FRF relocation and place the United States in an awkward position of pulling out of the international agreement. Placing HQ elements separate from the subordinate units is a key concern in respect to C2. The most controversial issue is the availabletraining space for appropriate MAGTF on Guam that satisfies pre-deployment training requirements that is in serious doubt. Complaints from a minor segment of Japanese society must be ignored and the entire Roadmap for Realignmentmust be scrapped and renewal of negotiations for a realignment agreement that puts common sense approaches to defense posture in the Pacific.

Military leaders who allow their experience and loyalty to their oath guide their actionswhen speaking out in the proper forums for or against policies, strategies, or ideals can positivelyaffect the welfare of the troops in the field and build a bridge with civilian leadership and thecivilian population.

The Soviet Union is well-known for its development of operations as the linkage between tactics and strategy, and its application as operational art. The Red Army's development of deep battle during the interwar years and its refinement during World War II is an exceptional example of operational art and a testament to the genius of the Soviet Union's military theorists. Soviet-style operational art grew from an ideological concept at a heoretical level, to a political controlled strategic doctrine, emerged as an offensive biased operational mindset, and, if Finland is overlooked, resulted in World War II deep battle success. The Red Army achieved victory in both Finnish campaigns through sound strategic planning, mass, and decisive tactical action. However, Finland's systematic withdrawal prevented the destruction of its army - the key Soviet operationalobjective. Within five years the Soviet Union defeated Finland in two wars, but failed to realize its doctrinal concept of deep battle and by its own definition operational art. A direct corollary can be drawn between Soviet tactical success and herrealization of strategic ends without achieving operational goals. This experience questions the importance Soviet doctrine placed on operational art and highlights the primacy of competent strategic planning.

The Soviet Union is well-known for its development of operations as the linkage between tactics and strategy, and its application as operational art. The Red Army's development of deep battle during the interwar years and its refinement during World War II is an exceptional example of operational art and a testament to the genius of the Soviet Union's military theorists. Soviet-style operational art grew from an ideological concept at a heoretical level, to a political controlled strategic doctrine, emerged as an offensive biased operational mindset, and, if Finland is overlooked, resulted in World War II deep battle success. The Red Army achieved victory in both Finnish campaigns through sound strategic planning, mass, and decisive tactical action. However, Finland's systematic withdrawal prevented the destruction of its army- the key Soviet operational objective. Within five years the Soviet Union defeated Finland in two wars, but failed to realize its doctrinal concept of deep battle and by its own definition operational art. A direct corollary can be drawn between Soviet tactical success and herrealization of strategic ends without achieving operational goals. This experience questions the importance Soviet doctrine placed on operational art and highlights the primacy of competent strategic planning.

Since the very beginning of American history, African Americans have served alongside their white counterparts in virtually every major armed conflict on the high seas. This was especially true during the Civil War. The Union Navy continued to experience a shortage of available manpower to sufficiently man its fleet of 600 plus ships. Life aboard naval vessels was particularly harsh and naval recruiters did not hesitate to enlist African Americans.The African American sailor saw his service as an opportunity to rise above the status of social discrimination and segregation. Because of the shortage of able-bodied seamen in the Union Navy, African Americans were encouraged to join the naval service at a time when the Army and Marine Corps excluded their service. The Union Navy could not have achieved its mission without nearly one-fifth of its total manpower, the African American sailor. Their numbers provided the credible force required to execute the strategic aims of the Anaconda Plan and helped to ensure a Union victory. The service of African American sailors allowed the North to end the war much sooner than it would have without their service, thus preventing an even greater number of loss to human life.

This book examines the genesis of the term genocide, presents the widely accepted formal definition, and illustrates examples of the characteristics of genocide. As an illustration for better understanding, this book examines the relationship between the United States of America and the Cherokee Indian Nation in their struggle first for sovereignty and then their attempt at assimilation. Though the book leads the reader through injustices dealt to the Cherokee Indian, it ultimately explains why genocide is not the applicable term to use to describe the natural progression of civilized culture.The United States is the world's only remaining superpower. Because of this, the eyes of the world constantly examine this country's actions and evaluate their merit. In order to remain in positive light military operations, as an extension of government policy, must be executed by military leadership that understands genocide, can recognize the patterns that can result in genocidal activities and how they can impact the mission. Armed with the understanding of genocide and how foreign countries view the United States, military commanders can better articulate the purpose of their operations in order to project the best possible message to the world audience and remain disassociated from the negative connotations associated with accusations of genocidal activities.

Did "Fighting Joe" Hooker of the army of the Potomac lose his nerve during the Chancellorsville Campaign of 1863? Perhaps history has failed to recognize Major General Joseph Hooker's true commander's intent for this campaign. Hooker's intent was simple: maneuver forces to Lee's flank and rear in order to force a withdrawal of Confederate troops from Fredericksburg. Hooker had no intention of engaging in a "risky confrontation" with General Robert E. Lee and the army of northern Virginia. Hooker's plan would fail due to his own steadfast belief in the ability of his plan to force Lee to withdraw. To say that Lee defeated the army of the Potomac is misleading because Lee did not defeat the army, he defeated Hooker as he fought a very effective defensive battle that removed the federal threat fromVirginia due to Hooker's failings as an army commander.