William R. Uttal

Psychology deals with the most complex subject matter of any science. As such, it is subject to misunderstandings, artifacts, and just simple errors of data, logic, and interpretation. This book teases out the details of some of the sources of these errors. It considers errors in psychological data and theories that arise from confusing endogenous and exogenous causal forces in perceptual research, misinterpreting the effects of inevitable natural laws as psychological phenomena, improper application of statistics and measurement, and flawed assumptions. Examples of each of these sources of error are presented and discussed. Finally, the book concludes that a return to a revitalized kind of behaviorism is preferred, rather than continuing on the current cognitive path.

Is psychology a science? Unlike Darwinian theory in biology or relativity and quantum theory in physics, psychology lacks the basic quantitative or conceptual foundation for a consensus view about how the mind works. Is psychology on the verge of developing such a foundation? "Probably not," answers psychologist William R. Uttal in this iconoclastic and critical examination of psychology's underlying principles, assumptions, and concepts. In five in-depth chapters and one appendix, he explores the following key issues: *What do we mean by "science" and can psychology be legitimately described as a science? *What are the general principles that should be applied to any science? *What is the role of mathematics in psychology? *Given the current fragmented state of the discipline, is it possible to identify the general principles of a scientific psychology? *Is experimental psychology just applied epistemology and not really scientific? Uttal comes to the conclusion that psychology is a science only to the extent that it is behaviorist in orientation. By comparing his discipline to other sciences, he identifies its limits, establishes a set of principles that help to define psychology as a science, and suggests plausible future developments.

In this fascinating book, William R. Uttal raises the possibility that, however much we learn about the anatomy and physiology of the brain and psychology, we may never be able to cross the final bridge explaining how the mind is produced by the brain. Three main classes of mind-brain theory are considered and rejected: field theories, because they are based on a superficial analogy; single cell theories, because they emerge from a massive uncontrolled experimental program; and neural net theories, because they are constrained by combinatorial complexity.To support his argument, Uttal explores the empirical and conceptual foundations of these theoretical approaches and identifies flaws in their fundamental logic. The author concludes that the problems preventing solution of the mind-brain problem are intractable, yet well within the confines of natural science.

Directed to scholars and senior-level graduate students, this book is an iconoclastic survey of the history of dualism and its impact on contemporary cognitive psychology. It argues that much of modern cognitive or mentalist psychology is built upon a cryptodualism--the idea that the mind and brain can be thought of as independent entities. This dualism pervades so much of society that it covertly influences many aspects of modern science, particularly psychology. To support the argument, the history of dualism is extended over 100,000 years--from the Paleolithic times until modern philosophical and psychological thinking. The questions regarding this topic that are answered in the book are: 1) Does dualism influence the scientific theories of psychology? 2) If so, should dualism be put aside in the search for a more objective analysis of human mentation?

Psychology deals with the most complex subject matter of any science. As such, it is subject to misunderstandings, artifacts, and just simple errors of data, logic, and interpretation. This book teases out the details of some of the sources of these errors. It considers errors in psychological data and theories that arise from confusing endogenous and exogenous causal forces in perceptual research, misinterpreting the effects of inevitable natural laws as psychological phenomena, improper application of statistics and measurement, and flawed assumptions. Examples of each of these sources of error are presented and discussed. Finally, the book concludes that a return to a revitalized kind of behaviorism is preferred, rather than continuing on the current cognitive path.

William Uttal is concerned that in an effort to prove itself a hard science, psychology may have thrown away one of its most important methodological tools-a critical analysis of the fundamental assumptions that underlie day-to-day empirical research. In this book Uttal addresses the question of localization: whether psychological processes can be defined and isolated in a way that permits them to be associated with particular brain regions. New, noninvasive imaging technologies allow us to observe the brain while it is actively engaged in mental activities. Uttal cautions, however, that the excitement of these new research tools can lead to a neuroreductionist wild goose chase. With more and more cognitive neuroscientific data forthcoming, it becomes critical to question their limitations as well as their potential. Uttal reviews the history of localization theory, presents the difficulties of defining cognitive processes, and examines the conceptual and technical difficulties that should make us cautious about falling victim to what may be a "neo-phrenological" fad.

For many years behaviorism was criticized because it rejected the study of perception. This rejection was based on the extreme view that percepts were internal subjective experiences and thus not subject to examination. This book argues that this logic is incorrect and shows how visual perception, particularized in the study of form recognition, can be carried out from the behavioral point of view if certain constraints and limitations are understood and accepted. The book discusses the idea of representation of forms, considers the major historical neural, psychological, and computational theories of form recognition, and then concludes by presenting a modern approach to the problem. In this book, William Uttal continues his critical analysis of the foundations of modern psychology. He is particularly concerned with the logical and conceptual foundations of visual perception and uses form recognition as a vehicle to rationalize the discrepancies between classic behaviorism and what we now appreciate are legitimate research areas.

This book considers one of the most fundamental, but only infrequently considered, issues in psychology--Are mental processes accessible by means of verbal reports and/or experimental assays? It is argues that this is the main characteristic distinguishing between behaviorism and mentalistic cognitivism. The answer posed by the author is that, with few exceptions and for the most fundamental reasons, mental processes are not accessible and that any psychology, such as contemporary cognitivism, based on a putative analysis of mind into its mental components must be fallacious. Classic and modern arguments against both mentalism and behaviorism are reviewed. In general, it is concluded that most antibehaviorist arguments are based on second order humanistic considerations rather than those underlying the usual scientific standards. Behaviorism represents the best that can be done in a situation of fundamental immeasurability and uncertainty. A modern version is offered in the final chapter of this book.

This volume examines the scientific basis of reductionist approaches to understanding visual perception. The author makes the provocative argument that contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science have gone off on a wild-goose chase in the search for reductionist explanations of perceptual phenomena. This book considers some specific and general examples of this misdirection and suggests an alternative future course for science. It reviews the successes and failures of the sciences' efforts to explain perceptual and other mental functions in the terms of either internal cognitive mechanisms, formal models, or the neural structures from which the brain--the organ of the mind--is constructed. Although this is an iconoclastic and minority view, the book shows how many contemporary perceptual scientists have qualified their thinking with regard to what their data and theories mean even while generally accepting the empirical findings. It is, without question, an attempted refutation of some of the primary assumptions of contemporary theory. Summing up the author's convictions concerning some of the most important questions of human nature, this book is a statement of a point of view that has provided a framework for his personal answers to some of these important questions of human history.

This research monograph describes a large programming project in which an underwater organism, capable of perceiving, learning, deciding, and navigating, is computationally simulated. The developed computational model serves as a contemporary theory of perceptual-motor performance, embodying much of what is known about human vision and some of what is known about other cognitive processes. This artificial intelligence project has substantial contributions to make to the development of autonomous underwater vehicles. It also makes a specific theoretical statement about the organization and nature of organic perceptual motor systems that may be useful to psychologists, neuroscientists, and theoreticians in a number of other fields.

First published in 1987. This book is the fourth in a series of research monographs reporting the results of a continuing study that deals with the perception of form in two- and three-dimensional space.