Usmc Command and Staff College

Joshua Chamberlains superior command leadership, imaginative planning, and aggressive conduct during the Civil War provide a powerful example of exceptional combat leadership. After studying the descriptions laid down by Clausewitz and then studying the decisions and actions of Joshua Chamberlain in the events in which he was involved during the Civil War, Joshua Chamberlain as a general would qualify for the title of "genius." Joshua Chamberlain's genius residing in his outlook on management and leadership also tended toward the pragmatic. Far from being influenced primarily by irrelevant and high-flown notions based upon "book learning", he learned through study and application, as well as by working with mentoring associates, to put theory into practice the discarded those approaches which proves non-useful and carefully preserved those precepts and practices which had been successfully applied in both military and civilian settings

U.S. amphibious warfare began its development in the early 1900's, became a real capability in World War II, and today provides the nation with a means to achieve its policy objectives with an ability to project military power from the sea.During World War II, the first real test of this amphibious assault capability came at the beginning of the Central Pacific drive on Tarawa in 1943 and culminated with the final amphibious operation in the Pacific at Okinawa, some 350 miles south of mainland Japan. Ultimately, the U.S. military's tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting amphibious operations in the Pacific theater during World War II became more efficient as the war progressed, largely due to anincreased understanding of the requirements for success in the combat environment, and an emphasis on meeting and exceeding those needs.

Given the realities of the modem battlefield ranging from major contingency operations to hybrid threats. the currentfiscal restraints and the rapidly decreasing combat overmatch of the M1A1 Abrams tank compared to other tanksthroughout the world, the Marine Corps must determine its future tank acquisition strategy in the near future in order tomaintain a platform that will fulfill its roles beyond 2025. This paper presents four relevant courses of action for theMarine Corps to pursue m aquiring its next tank platform. and utilizes the history of tanks in the Marine Corps, the rolestanks have played and will play in future warfare and its current mission to compare and contrast each of these coursesof action

The concepts of interior and exterior lines gained prominence during the Napoleonic Era with the writings of Jomni. Interior Lines of Operation deal with forces whose operations diverge from a central point. The use of interior lines allows a commander to rapidly shift forces to the decisive point. The battle of Gettysburg was a great historical example illustrating the impact of interiorand exterior lines. Throughout the three days of battle, General Meade applied Operational Art in positioning his forces at the decisive time and place. One must keep in mind the significance of General Meade's actions at Gettysburg. He defeated the venerable General Robert E. Lee on the battlefield, a feat elusive to all previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac. This featwas made possible by the ability to decisively shape the battlefield using interior lines.

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has a long history of seizing anddefending advance bases;. Prior to World War I, base defense was the Marine Corps'main mission. l During World War I, the Advance Base Force was created to seize anddefend enemy territory, primarily bases. In 1933, the Advance Base Force transformedinto the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) under Commandant Major General Ben Fuller.2 By1939, the looming threat of Japanese aggression in the Pacific solidified the need for'advance base defense and Commandant Major General Thomas Holcomb formed fourDefense Battalions to defend advance naval bases from ground and air attack.3 The coreof the original battalions were formed from two infantry battalions, 1st and 2nd Battalion,15th Marine Regiment. 4 Subsequent Defense Battalions were formed with air defensepersonnel and artillerymen; infantrymen were attached as required. The first DefenseBattalions included nearly 900 Marines, three anti-aircraft batteries, three seacoastbatteries, and ground and anti-aircraft machine gun batteries.s Follow on evolutionsincluded more sophisticated artillery, anti-aircraft guns and search radars. These DefenseBattalions provided the first combined arms teams and proved to be very effectivefighting forces.

This paper is designed to explain the capabilities of the LAR battalion, and how it can be used to operate for anextended period behind enemy lines or in denied enemy territory in order to shape the battlefield for commanders. Itbegins with the Marine Corps' acquisition of the LAV platform, covers the various initial concepts of employment, thendiscusses the current organization of the battalion, followed by a description of the current doctrine. The paper thendescribes the deployments and combat operations of LAR units, discusses the origins of modern operational maneuvergroups, details LAR's role in testing a concept of deep maneuver during Operation DEEP STRIKE, and discusses theemployment of LAR as a deep maneuver element in Iraq and Afghanistan. It concludes with a future concept ofemployment in irregular warfare offering a way forward for the LAR community to realize its maximum potential andadvocate to break away from unimaginative, and doctrineally incorrect, modes of employment while still maintain a solidI grounding in providing its supported commander a tactically and operationally mobile reconnaissance asset.

The post-Cold War era presented to the nations of the world the opportunity toexperience peace in a way that had not been enjoyed for decades, if not centuries. However, since the end of the Cold War there have been a significant number of smaller conflicts, genocides, ethnic cleansings, and regional battles. The September 11, 2001, attacks against targets in the United States brought the strife to the US in an unexpected way.Since that day, there has been a significant level of US military activity in the world, and plenty of debate over how to do it. One of the most interesting aspects of the debate is over the "preemptive war" that was started in Iraq. While this thesis is not specifically about Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is a catalyst, of sorts, for studying the subject of the Just War Tradition and itsinfluence on preemptive military activities.

The United States has been involved in combat operations for the past decade. Some of the darkest moments in thoseconflicts have come from the ethical failings of some of our service members. The Marine Corps prides itself onmaintaining high ethical standards; however, we are not immune to these failings - as seen by the body desecrationvideo and SS flag photos in Afghanistan. These failings have occurred during times of high operational tempo and havecaused Marine Corps leadership, the public, and civilian leaders to question our ethical foundations and training. Whatcan the Marine Corps do to create Marines who are ethical when it matters the most? Through integrated leadership andethics education in the leadership continuum, the Marine Corps can create a resilient and ethical force better preparedfor the moral dilemmas of combat operations, military service, and life after the military.

Shaping efforts In the Maghreb and Sahel are extensive and commendable but lack appropriate interagency synchronization and an appropriate balance between the development and defense approaches. In order to achieve greater success in this critical region of Africa, the United States must adapt to the asymmetric environment, empower the DoS to lead and execute foreign policy, decrease the perceived militarization of foreign policy, and adjust within DoDto address the likely challenges of today and tomorrow.

General George Crook's initial experiences in Native American warfare were so profound that they shaped him in a wayvery much unlike his contemporary officers. During General George Crook's Second Apache Campaign (1882-1886), his unique approach to the use of Apache scouts and his culturally sensitive leadership were so misunderstood by hiscontemporaries that it eventually led to his resignation of command and the imprisonment of all Chiricahua Apachescouts who faithfully served the US Army following General Nelson Miles' successful completion of the Apachecampaign. General Crook displayed the right balance of warrior determination and humanitarian awareness in hisleadership of the Arizona Territory. He was the right man, in the right place, at the right time. General Crook'seffectiveness as a war fighter and his cultural awareness in handling a successful counterinsurgency and pacificationprogram provide lessons that are relevant to contemporary professional military officers engaged in twenty-first centuryoperations

U.S. amphibious warfare began its development in the early 1900's, became a real capability in World War II, and today provides the nation with a means to achieve its policy objectives with an ability to project military power from the sea.During World War II, the first real test of this amphibious assault capability came at the beginning of the Central Pacific drive on Tarawa in 1943 and culminated with the final amphibious operation in the Pacific at Okinawa, some 350 miles south of mainland Japan. Ultimately, the U.S. military's tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting amphibious operations in the Pacific theater during World War II became more efficient as the war progressed, largely due to anincreased understanding of the requirements for success in the combat environment, and an emphasis on meeting and exceeding those needs.

In 2008, two Marine Corps infantry battalions (Battalion Landing Team 1/6 and Task Force 2/7) operated in Helmand -Province, Afghanistan. Each battalion operated in a different sized battlespace in rural areas and each battalion metwith a different degree of success. Both battalions found that in rural counterinsurgency operations a unit's Area of -Influence ebbs and flows over time and is driven by physical and moral factors that must be taken into considerationwhen designing a unit's campaign plan and formulating a realistic desired endstate. The analysis concludes that a unit'sarea of influence needs to be studied, evaluated, and constantly reevaluated during operations to enable commanders tonimbly adapt to the ever evolving situation in a counterinsurgency campaign. Incorporating the discourse on a unit'sArea of Influence into Problem Framing provides a compatible venue for detailed analysis.

This paper is an historical analysis of the effectiveness of General Lee's command during the .Battle of Gettysburg: The argument is made and defended that General Lee's effectiveness of command during the Battle of Gettysburg wasreduced because of the absence of two of his trusted subordinates and his interaction with other senior leaders in theArmy of North.em Virginia. This paper examines the period from the Battle of Chancellorsviile to the BattlE? of Gettysburg,186 . The life of General Lee is discussed briefly' up t111 the Battle of Gettysburg, along with t e topics: Lee's TrustedSubordinates, 'Chancellorsville, Lee's reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Gettysburg, lee's Effectiveness atGettysburg, and finally the Conclusion. The Conclusion provides a summary as well as discussing lessons to belearned